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h i g h l i g h t s
• Conventional models of financial contagion comprise bank balance sheets.
• Fluctuations in asset returns will change banks’ susceptibility to contagion.
• Financial contagion may be modeled without individual balance sheets.
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a b s t r a c t
I show the equivalence between amodel of financial contagion and the thresholdmodel of global cascades
proposed byWatts (2002). Themodel financial network comprises banks that hold risky external assets as
well as interbank assets. It is shown that a simple thresholdmodel can replicate the size and the frequency
of financial contagion without using information about individual balance sheets.
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Bank default is contagious. The failure of a single bank can
spread through financial networks, generating default cascades.
Over the past few years, many researchers in various fields of
natural and social sciences, such as physicists, ecologists and
economists, have been addressing the question of how to prevent
financial contagion (e.g., Nier et al., 2007; Soramäki et al., 2007;
Gai and Kapadia, 2010; Gai et al., 2011; Lenzu and Tedeschi, 2012;
Kobayashi, 2013; Kobayashi and Hasui, 2014).
However, there is no wide agreement among researchers about
how to construct amodel of financial contagion. Different research
groups use different models, which make it difficult to establish a
consensus about policy implications.1
In this letter, I show the equivalence between a model of fi-
nancial contagion and the widely-used threshold model of global
∗ Tel.: +81 78 803 6692; fax: +81 78 803 6692.
E-mail address: kobayashi@econ.kobe-u.ac.jp.
1 See Lorenz et al. (2009) and Upper (2011) for a survey of the literature.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.05.003
0165-1765/© 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articlcascades proposed by Watts (2002).2 Basically, financial network
models require researchers to construct bank balance sheets. The
influence of a bank failure is then examined by sequentially under-
mining the interbank assets of the lenders. Second-round defaults
occur if the number of defaulted borrowers among total borrowers
exceeds a certain threshold.
This mechanism is closely related to that of the Watts model
of cascades. I show that there is no need to construct bank balance
sheets as long as the ‘‘shadow’’ threshold of default is appropriately
defined in accordance with the volatility of assets.
2. The models
2.1. A model of financial contagion
The model of financial contagion used in this paper is an ex-
tended version of Gai and Kapadia (2010). The essential difference
2 See, for example, Dodds andWatts (2004), Gleeson and Cahalane (2007), Watts
and Dodds (2007) and Gleeson (2013).
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
114 T. Kobayashi / Economics Letters 124 (2014) 113–116n
Fig. 1. A typical bank’s balance sheet.
is that I take into account stochastic fluctuations in the value of ex-
ternal assets.
A typical bank’s balance sheet is illustrated in Fig. 1. There are
N banks in the financial market. Bank i holds risky external assets,
ai, interbank assets, li, and riskless assets, bi. On the liability side,
there are deposits, di, interbank liabilities, p¯i, and networth,wi. The
balance-sheet condition implies that ai + li + bi = di + p¯i + wi.
Banks are connected to each other by lending and borrowing.
The existence of a lending–borrowing relationship is expressed as
a link or an edge. In network theory, the number of outgoing links
is called out-degree, while the number of incoming links is called
in-degree. The direction of links represents the flow of funds at the
time of initial lending.
The amount of bank i’s borrowings from bank j is expressed as
πijp¯i, where πij denotes the relative weight of bank i’s borrowings
from j, and thereby

j≠i πij = 1, i = 1, . . . ,N . The amount of
bank i’s total interbank assets is given by li =Nj≠i πjip¯j.
Bank iwill default if
p¯i >

j≠i
πjipj + a˜i + bi − di, (1)
where a˜i and pj stand for the ex-post values of external assets
and interbank liabilities, respectively. It should be pointed out
that deposits, di, are reserved because they are senior to interbank
assets.
Provided that there is no loss in interbank assets, a bank will
default with probability δ due to a loss of external assets. δ
indicates the probability of fundamental defaults, which is assumed
to be common across banks.
If bank j fails, then bank j’s creditors lose all of the credits they
extended to bank j. Some of these creditors may fail due to the loss
of their interbank assets. Accordingly, the creditors of the creditors
of bank jmay fail as well, because they in turn lose the credits they
extended to the failed banks.
Given the size of each interbank asset, the total sizes of inter-
bank assets and liabilities are determined by the structure of the
interbank network. To ensure that the probability of fundamental
defaults is the same across banks, the relative size of external as-
sets to net worth is fixed. If bank i has so many incoming links that
its liability side is bigger than its tentative total assets, li + ai + b¯i,
where b¯i denotes the tentatively assigned riskless assets, then risk-less assets are added to adjust the asset side. Otherwise, deposits
are imposed to adjust the liability side.3 After such adjustments,
the capital ratio,wi/(li+ai+bi), may differ across banks while the
tentative capital ratio,wi/(li+ai+ b¯i) ≡ γ , is common. The tenta-
tive ratio of total interbank assets to total assets, li/(li+ai+b¯i) ≡ θ il ,
is allowed to vary across banks.
2.2. The Watts model of global cascades
Let us summarize the Watts (2002) threshold model of cas-
cades. In this model, each node in the network takes one of two
states: ‘‘flipped’’ or ‘‘not flipped’’. The network is undirected.
Let ki and mi denote node i’s degree and the number of its
flipped neighbors, respectively. The algorithm of cascading behav-
ior in the Watts model is that
node i flips ifmi > φiki,
node i does not flip otherwise,
where φi ∈ [0, 1] is the threshold of flipping for node i. This means
that the threshold number of flipped neighbors abovewhich node i
will flip is ⌊φiki⌋, where ⌊x⌋ denotes the floor function that returns
the maximum integer smaller than x.
3. Equivalence between a financial network model and a
threshold model
Here, I show the equivalence between the financial network
model and a modified version of the threshold model. Recall that
the ex-post value of external assets, a˜i, is determined stochastically.
Let∆ai ≡ a˜i − ai be the return of external assets.
Let us suppose that the amount of individual interbank lending
is common. Then, if ∆ai = 0, bank i will fail if the fraction of its
defaulted borrowers exceeds ⌊wi/li⌋. Note that there is no possi-
bility of contagious default if wi > li, as long as there is no loss in
external assets.
If ∆ai ≠ 0, on the other hand, the threshold for the fraction of
defaulted borrowers depends on the realization of asset returns. If
a bank earns positive (negative) returns from its external assets, it
becomesmore resilient against (susceptible to) contagious default.
Let φ˜i be the ‘‘shadow’’ threshold of default for bank i. It follows
that
φ˜i = wi +∆aili
= γ
θ il
+ ∆ai
li
, for i ∈ {i|li > 0}. (2)
Here, θ il is treated as a parameter. Thus, if asset returns,∆ai, follow
a distribution of mean zero and variance σ 2i , then the shadow
threshold φ˜i follows a distribution of mean
γ
θ il
and variance

σi
li
2
.
More generally, the p.d.f . of φ˜i, defined as fi(·), is given by
fi(x) = li · gi(x · li − γ li/θ il ), i ∈ {i|li > 0} (3)
where gi(·) is the p.d.f. of∆ai.
Let us assume that asset returns follow a normal distribution
with mean zero. Let z˜ ≡ F−1(δ), where F−1 is the inverse
c.d.f . of the standard normal distribution. The standard deviation
3 Notice that this adjustment does not affect the probability of fundamental
default.
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of banks go bankrupt. BS model A: the baseline model. BS model B: the ratio of interbank assets to total assets is distributed on [.2, .4]. BS model C: the size of individual
interbank assets is distributed on [.2, 1.8].of asset returns,σi, such that the probability of fundamental default
becomes δ is given as
σi = −wiz˜ , ∀ i,
= −γ li
θ il z˜
, for i ∈ {i|li > 0}. (4)
It follows fromEqs. (2) and (4) that the shadow threshold φ˜i follows
a normal distribution with mean γ /θ il and standard deviation
−γ /(θ il z˜).4
In this way, the balance sheet-based model of financial
contagion shown above can be expressed as a simple threshold
model. Intuitively, the shadow threshold will become smaller as
the returns of external assets take a lower value, meaning that the
bank becomes more susceptible to default contagion. Those banks
that have a negative value of φ˜i will fail at the beginning, which
corresponds to the case of fundamental defaults in the model of
financial contagion.5
I consider three variants of the model: Cases A, B and C. In Case
A, or the baseline model, the size of individual interbank assets is
fixed at unity, and θ il = θl = .3 for i ∈ {i|li > 0}. In Case B, θ il is
assumed to be uniformly distributed on [.2, .4]. In Case 3, the size
of individual interbank asset is uniformly distributed on [.2, 1.8].
In Fig. 2, a balance sheet-based contagion model, called ‘‘BS
model’’, is compared with the corresponding threshold model.
With respect to BS model C, the corresponding threshold model
is modified as follows:
node i flips if µi > φi,
node i does not flip otherwise,
4 Recall that z˜ takes a negative value.
5 Note that Prob(φ˜i < 0) = Prob( γ
θ il
− γ y
θ il z˜
< 0) = F(y < z˜) = δ, where y is a
random variable from the standard normal distribution.where µi ∈ [0, 1] is the sum of the flipped neighbors’ weights.
It should be pointed out that µi is not necessarily equal to mi/ki
unless identical weights are given to all the neighbors.
Given the average degree, Erdös–Rényi (directed) random net-
works are created 20 times, and asset returns and shadow thresh-
olds are independently generated 1000 times for each network
structure. Other parameters are as follows: N = 1000, γ = .1
and δ = .01.
Fig. 2 reveals that in all cases, an appropriately defined thresh-
old model can replicate the size and frequency of financial conta-
gion generated by the BS model.
4. Conclusion and discussion
The methods shown in this letter will enable us to analyze
financial contagion without detailed information about every
single balance sheet. What is needed is the distribution of balance-
sheet components among banks. Fluctuations in asset returns and
cross-sectional differences in various balance-sheet parameters
can be incorporated into the threshold model.
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